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Abstract: 
Many cities in water-stressed environments are seeking sustainable alternatives to 
traditional solutions such as supply augmentation and water restrictions. One 
alternative is to upgrade urban water systems in an integrated manner. Design of an 
Integrated Urban Water System (IUWS) requires understanding the risk of the IUWS 
failing to deliver sustainable outcomes. We present a rationale for enhancing well-
established risk assessment and management tools with concepts of ecosystem 
resilience. While traditional risk assessment focuses on the states of controls that 
operate on specific system components and the likelihood and consequences of 
control failure, resilience theory addresses whole-of-system behavior. In identifying 
critical controls, risk management focuses on the ability to prevent failure and 
stabilize a certain system state, while resilience focuses on the ‘uncontrollable’ to 
identify pathways for managing system adaptation to change. Based on conceptual 
analysis of two key resilience metaphors, the ‘stability landscape’ and the ‘adaptive 
cycle’, we investigate pathways towards risk-based IUWS design and management 
that explicitly include system resilience as an over-arching measure of sustainability. 
Areas for future research include development of methodologies for measuring 
system adaptive capacity, and identifying and quantifying emerging thresholds. 
The challenge for the risk assessment community is to reconsider what ‘risk’ is: in a 
resilience context, events traditionally seen as risky are not necessarily bad, and may 
become opportunities. The challenge for the resilience community is to identify 
thresholds and the system’s proximity to them. 





Increasing demands for urban water services driven by rapid population growth in the 
face of climate change and the related risks of longer droughts and more erratic rain 
storms are pushing urban water systems to the limits – limits that water planners have 
been comfortable with for decades. Traditional command-and-control style solutions 
such as supply augmentation and water restrictions are no longer guaranteed to deliver 
system sustainability. Jurisdictions are therefore forced to seek alternatives to manage 
the sustainability of utility provision while also managing the sustainability of the 
larger system that generates the utility. 
 
One approach to sustainable urban water service provision is the design and 
implementation of Integrated Urban Water Systems (IUWS’s). The IUWS takes a 
three-pronged approach, considering such options as storm- and wastewater 
substitution as a source of supply, increasing water efficiency through demand 
management and seeking new supply sources. Well-established technologies are 
being supplemented with new approaches and techniques, and the scale of application 
of these technologies ranges from individual households to whole cities and regions. 
IUWS design incorporates economic, technical, environmental, social and health-
related aspects of water service provision. 
 
For an IUWS to be sustainable, its design process needs to consider the vulnerability 
of the system to natural hazards, malfunctioning, misconstruction, misuse, operational 
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failure, etc. Options selection and system design should be informed by an analysis of 
the risk of ‘unsustainable functioning’ due to these threats.  
However, conventional risk assessment carries the assumption of predictability 
whereas the empirical reality is that an IUWS is inherently unpredictable because it is 
interlinked with other systems (e.g., the human economy and surrounding 
ecosystems). Ultimately, its sustainability performance relies on the functioning and 
interaction of these interconnected sub-systems rather than on just the stability of the 
physical components of the IUWS. Conventional risk management does not consider 
such interlinked factors (Hollnagel et al. 2006); rather, traditional risk analysts 
‘isolate’, or deconstruct, their systems for mathematical convenience.  
In addition, the negative connotations of the term ‘risk’ will advocate management of 
the identified risks to pre-empt and avoid breakdowns by maintaining a system in its 
current state whereas system ‘collapse’ may actually be a prerequisite for 
sustainability of the IUWS. 
Thus, to properly inform the design of an IUWS in the context of sustainability, risk 
assessment and management needs to be amended with notions of persistence, change 
and unpredictability. 
 
In recent years, increasing attention has been drawn to resilience as a key system 
property underpinning sustainability. The term resilience, initially used in mechanics 
to indicate the power of an object or system to ‘recoil’, or to resume its original shape 
or position after reacting to an applied force, was brought into the realm of ecosystem 
analysis and management in the early 1970s (Holling 1973). The resilience of a 
coupled system of people and nature, termed ‘Social-Ecological System’ (SES) by 
resilience theorists (Berkes et al. 2003), is now seen by many as the key to 
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sustainability in the wider sense (e.g., Common 1995; Perrings 1996; Ludwig et al. 
1997; Brock et al. 2002).  However, in spite of thirty years of scientific analysis and 
debate, no consensus on how to operationalize resilience has been reached.  
Klein et al. (2003) reviewed a wide range of ecological and social perspectives on 
resilience and concluded that the definition of resilience has become so broad that it 
renders the concept “almost meaningless”. They advocate that resilience is best 
defined as 1) the amount of disturbance a system can absorb and still remain within 
the same ‘attractor basin’, and 2) the degree to which the system is capable of self-
organization. Klein et al. (2003) argue that both attributes are amenable to 
measurement and monitoring, but also warn that the challenge remains to transform 
the concept of resilience into an operational tool for policy and management purposes. 
 
Given the intuitive similarities between the fields of risk assessment and resilience 
concepts, an in-depth comparison is pertinent to conceptualizing a more 
comprehensive risk management framework. In this paper, we articulate how risk and 
resilience approaches in the context of sustainable urban water systems may 
complement each other. We review early work in this area (e.g., Hasihimoto 1982; 
Fiering 1982a-d) and analyze two resilience metaphors; the ‘adaptive cycle’ and the 
‘stability landscape’ and explore how they could potentially be incorporated into risk 
analysis and management for sustainable urban water design.  
 
The paper comprises seven sections. Following the Introduction, we take a brief look 
at sustainable urban water practice. We then review the state of the art in risk 
assessment and management from a whole-of-systems perspective, and look at 
resilience concepts and applications to water resource management. We summarize 
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the concepts that are common to risk and resilience before exploring a notional 
pathway for incorporating resilience into practical applications of risk management to 
sustainable urban water systems. Results and implications of our research are 
summarized and discussed in the final section. 
 
Sustainable Urban Water Systems 
 
Bruntland (1987) first defined sustainable development as “development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs”. From this definition extensive debate ensued as to the nature 
of sustainability and the derivation of appropriate measures (e.g., Bell and Morse 
1999; Moffatt et al. 2001). Measures of sustainability can apply to the performance of 
the whole system, or require an aggregation of the performance of individual parts of 
the system. The most frequently used measures generally address social, 
environmental and economic performance (the ‘Triple Bottom Line’ approach; see 
e.g. Foran et al. 2005). 
 
In endeavoring to achieve a sustainable IUWS, an approach commonly adopted by 
practitioners in the water industry is to compare the social, economic and 
environmental (‘Triple Bottom Line’) performance of selected options against current 
practice (business as usual), in terms of agreed measures (see Maheepala et al. 2003). 
Measures that are evaluated for IUWS are generally limited to those for which 
calculation methods exist, such as use of potable water, World Health Organization 
water quality measures, lifecycle costs and nutrient flows. Measures of ecological 
health of urban waterways and groundwater systems, or greenhouse emissions 
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relating to water supply and use might also be included. Social performance is harder 
to measure, and in practical applications social values are often derived from small 
samples or expert opinion. The performance of each option is appraised in terms of 
agreed measures and criteria, and multi-objective analysis is then applied to assist 
identification of preferred options. Comparison avoids the need to seek absolute 
measures of sustainability. 
 
If sustainability is to be achieved, the performance of an IUWS must be assessed in 
such a way that controls on their continued performance can be identified, monitored 
and managed throughout their lifetime. Further, the ability of the system as a whole to 
accommodate innovations and changes, such as new water-conservation technologies, 
the introduction of full-cost water pricing or the impacts of climate change, should be 
maintained and enhanced. 
 
Current risk assessment methods are typically limited to a pragmatic evaluation of the 
risk of the system failing to meet the traditional ‘Triple Bottom Line’ sustainability 
criteria, and they do not take into account evaluation of the resilience of the system. 
Yet without comprehensive evaluation of the risk of ‘unsustainability’, the impact of 
human actions into the future cannot be well understood and our decisions will be 
flawed. An exception is the work of Hashimoto et al. (1982). To address issues related 
to temporal variability in water supply, Hashimoto et al. (1982) defined the criteria of 
reliability, resilience, and vulnerability to evaluate water resources systems. They 
defined reliability as the probability that system benefits or performance will be 
within an acceptable range (e.g., water demands met sufficiently), and resilience as a 
measure of the speed of recovery from an unsatisfactory condition. Hashimoto et al. 
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(1982) defined vulnerability as a measure of the extent or severity of the 
unsatisfactory condition.  
 
Simulation of time series of Hashimoto’s indices and subsequent summarization using 
statistical measures has recently been suggested as an alternative, whole-of-system 
approach to sustainability assessment (Kjeldsen and Rosbjerg 2004). However, 
Hashimoto’s definition of resilience classifies as ‘engineering resilience’ (Holling 
1996) and, although a quantifiable parameter, may effectively constitute a partial 
sustainability indicator from the resilience perspective. This issue is discussed in more 
detail later. 
 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management  
Australia was one of the first countries to develop a national risk management 
standard; Australian Standard 4360 defines risk as “the chance of something 
happening that will have an adverse impact upon objectives, and is measured in terms 
of consequences and likelihood” (Standards Australia 2004). The basic risk 
management process is summarized in Figure 1. Steps to establish the context and 
identify, analyze and evaluate the risks and controls are termed ‘risk assessment’. 
Controlling and mitigating the risks, monitoring and reassessing comprise the ‘risk 
management’ process.  
 
[FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE – THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS] 
 
Risk management requires that risks be reduced when some nominated value, 
representing unacceptable risk, is exceeded. Risk is generally quantified by evaluating 
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a function of the frequency of an event or change occurring (or the frequency of 
controls failing) and the magnitude of the consequence. The ability of an IUWS to 
deal with - or benefit from - shocks, malfunctions, misconstruction, misuse and 
operational failure from the perspective of sustainability will vary with the nominated 
technologies and management strategies, and the environment in which it operates. 
Each IUWS will therefore have a different risk of failing to deliver, and this risk can 
be seen as the over-arching indicator of its sustainability. Of two systems that have 
the same nominal performance, the one with the lower risk of failure will be 
preferable; a system with lower risk of failure might even be preferred over one with 
“better” nominal performance (Blackmore and Diaper 2004). Some form of risk 
assessment, leading to conscientious risk management, is therefore a necessary 
component of sustainability assessment. 
 
In theory, if all interactions within and around the system could be fully described and 
all different modes of failure identified, the impacts of all control failures on the 
system could be properly evaluated in terms of risk and procedures put in place to 
avoid or mitigate adverse consequences. In reality, resource constraints and the 
dynamic nature of the operating environment make such comprehensive evaluation of 
IUWS impossible, and systems often fail to perform as expected because of 
unforeseen events or unexpected combinations of events. Nonetheless, the risk 
assessor endeavors to identify and treat critical risks. 
Comprehensive risk assessment of large, interconnected, multi-component and multi-
functional systems is rarely attempted at the present time, but the techniques are 
similar to those applied within individual domains. Key components of 
comprehensive risk assessment are: 
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• Clearly stated objectives, with clearly identified measures (Bernstein 1996) 
For an IUWS, the main objective is generally to achieve sustainability. 
Sustainability assessment has already been described.  
• Comprehensiveness 
As many controls and influences on system performance as can be reasonably 
identified should be considered in the risk assessment. It is apparent that 
policy decisions, for example, such as recent decisions on the construction of a 
desalination plant in Sydney, and a decision to keep the Snowy River Hydro 
Scheme in public ownership, will affect the performance of any future IUWS 
in Australia’s major cities, and related risks should be carefully evaluated in 
the strategic decision processes. Ceasing to provide a subsidy for the 
installation of rainwater tanks (a change at local government level), or 
instigating compulsory tests for household greywater treatment plants (a 
change to the national plumbing code), would similarly affect sustainability. 
Controls that address both prevention and mitigation should be analyzed, and 
mitigation should include emergency response and recovery as well as 
response to more frequent and less severe events. 
 
A simple conceptual model illustrates the components of comprehensive risk 
assessment. To assist identification of the wide range of influences on system 
performance, the space within which the system operates can be considered as 
a series of domains (see e.g. IMO 2002), which can be independent, intersect 
each other, sit within each other, or interact with each other. Domains that 
might be considered in the design of sustainable IUWS are shown in Figure 2. 
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[FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE – URBAN WATER SYSTEM DOMAINS] 
From a risk management perspective, the state of all controls on the system 
(the ‘control state’), which defines the functioning of the system at any given 
time, is of critical importance. It is the risk of the system entering a control 
state that results in adverse consequences that is the concern of the risk 
assessor (Green and Leivesley 2001). In Figure 3, the arrow represents 
controls in each domain combining to influence the function of the system. 
Adjusting controls in any domain will change the angle of the arrow, and 
hence influence the overall system performance. In practice there will be many 
controls in each domain, and their possible states can be represented by a 
distribution varying from a simple ‘on/off’ to a complex probability 
distribution function.  
[FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE – CONTROLS] 
• Controls and factors 
In a risk context, controls act to prevent unwanted events or mitigate their 
consequences. At any time, the state of the system depends on the state of its 
controls (which can be adjusted) and factors acting upon it (which cannot). 
The controllability of the system depends on the ability of stakeholders to 
influence system performance. Each stakeholder may be concerned with a 
different target population, and context-specific institutional arrangements 
determine stakeholder power and legitimacy to control. For example, a utility 
may be concerned with the water users and the environment within its 
jurisdiction, and might have power to adjust technologies, system design, 
maintenance procedures, operations, and pricing structures, and even influence 
regulation. Householders, on the other hand, will only influence technologies 
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and water consumption within the household, in the best interest of the family 
members and their immediate surroundings. 
• Understanding relationships between the system and its controls 
Change and failure will occur within and between domains. Quantifying 
change within each domain is the subject of specialist studies. Changes across 
domains are harder to predict. For example, increasing periods of drought will 
affect both water usage (more garden watering) and water supply (less water 
in the dams); these affects might be accompanied by compulsory restrictions, 
as well as reduced infiltration (and hence slower flows) in sewers. Identifying 
all possible failures and feedbacks is practically impossible, and is a 
shortcoming of most current risk assessments. Consideration of holistic system 
performance, based on historic data, together with consideration of total 
system potential for malfunction, could overcome some of the problems. Such 
analysis might allow the integration of traditional engineering risk analysis 
with the precautionary approach of ecological risk assessment (Parkin et al. 
2003). 
• Accounting for time 
Fully comprehensive, dynamic risk assessment for IUWS should aim at 
addressing three time frames. First, there is the risk of failure given current 
external conditions, including the impact of seasonal fluctuations and other 
‘fast’ variables. This is the time-frame of most current risk assessments. Then 
there is the risk of the system failing because of changes in ‘slow’ external 
variables such as climate and demographics. Third, there is the risk of failure 
due to changes in the system itself and its control state. Examples include the 
introduction of new technologies, provision of additional elements, natural 
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adaptations or the removal or introduction of regulatory controls and financial 
incentives. Additional complications could arise from changes to objectives 
(which represent mankind’s current perception of the nature of the problem), 
and changes in the way in which achievement of performance is measured.  
• The risk function, episodic and chronic risk  
Risk is evaluated as a function of frequency and consequence. Where 
consequence is inversely proportional to frequency, simple multiplication 
provides an appropriate function; more complex functions are needed where 
the relationship is non-linear and where discontinuities or breakpoints occur 
(Drexler 1992). The frequency/consequence method of evaluation is suitable 
for chronic risks and events with relatively small consequence. However, the 
catastrophic consequences caused by a rare, episodic event might be 
disproportionately intolerable (incidentally, the risk might also be hard to 
calculate since there is likely to be very little data upon which to derive a 
frequency distribution). It might be desirable to consider alternative treatment 
for such events, possibly identifying controls that prevent such catastrophes 
whatever their predicted frequency, or ensuring that emergency management 
procedures are in place. This reasoning is demonstrated by the precautionary 
principle, which advocates the use of precautionary measures where there is 
seen to be threat to human health or the environment even though relationships 
between cause and effect cannot be fully established scientifically (CEC 
2000). The ability of systems to withstand or recover from severe shocks is 
rarely considered in current risk assessment, since the very low likelihood 
renders the risk acceptable despite the potential magnitude of the consequence. 
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• Thresholds 
Risk assessment is complicated by non-linear behavior. The existence of 
critical thresholds in control states (e.g., a valve functions correctly until a 
certain pressure is reached, at which point it seizes; funding for construction is 
withdrawn following a change in government), non-linear behavior of factors 
acting upon the system and non-linear responses of the system itself are all 
commonplace. While consequences can escalate dramatically due to non-
linear system behavior, the compound effects of passing thresholds in multiple 
control and factor states can also lead to catastrophic consequences. Analysis 
is further complicated by non-linearity in calculation methods and data, 
incomplete knowledge of parameter values for model inputs, inconsistency in 
the collection of base data and step functions in the algorithms of deterministic 
modeling. The combined effects of non-linearity are often unrecognized in 
current risk assessment. 
• Frequency data 
Failure characteristics in the technical domain (System Infrastructure in Figure 
3) are typically well known. For example, technical controls (pumps, pipes) in 
an urban water system are used in large quantities and their failure 
characteristics are well documented and quantified. ‘Collapses’ in the natural 
and human domains are generally much less well understood (Reason 1990), 
and feedbacks less well defined. There is still much research to be done in 
understanding and predicting interactions between man and physical aspects 
of systems, and in predicting the effectiveness of economic incentives (Berkes 
et al. 2003). This is of particular concern because the consequences of change 
in the human domain (e.g., the market uptake of a new appliance causing an 
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unforeseen increase in water use or risk to life) might be much more severe 
than failure of a control in the technical domain (e.g., failure of a pump in a 
sewage treatment plant, causing temporary congestion in the wastewater 
system). Further, human controls are more readily adjusted and provide a 
potential fast-track lever for enhancing sustainability.  
 
The reality is that comprehensive control for large, interconnected multi-functional, 
multi-component systems such as the IUWS is rarely achievable. At best, current 
practice might achieve comprehensive control within individual domains. 
 
Resilience and Adaptive Capacity 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, resilience is the act of rebounding or 
‘springing back’. The term refers to the power of an object or system to ‘recoil’, or to 
resume its original shape or position after compression, bending, etc. A second 
definition of resilience given by the Oxford English Dictionary is ‘elasticity’. In a 
purely mechanical sense, resilience is the energy per unit volume that can be absorbed 
by a material when it is subjected to strain (or rather the maximum value of this when 
the elastic limit is not exceeded). 
 
Resilience in Environmental Management 
Klein et al. (2003) provide a comprehensive overview of the conceptual development 
of resilience within the context of environmental management, with Holling’s seminal 
work from the early 1970s as a starting point. Rather than repeating this excellent 
work here, we focus on recent conceptual developments in resilience thinking and 
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applications of the resilience concept to water resources management and planning. 
Conceptual developments in resilience thinking in the context of environmental 
management are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[TABLE 1 NEAR HERE – DEFINITIONS OF RESILIENCE] 
 
Holling (1996) emphasized the difference between engineering resilience and 
ecological resilience to draw attention to the difference between efficiency, 
constancy, and predictability on the one hand and persistence, change and 
unpredictability on the other hand (Gunderson 2003). Engineering resilience (Pimm 
1991) considers ecological systems to exist close to a stable steady state. In this 
context, resilience is defined as:  
 
the return time to a steady sate following a perturbation. 
 
This definition carries an assumption of a single, global equilibrium. Ecological 
resilience, on the other hand, emphasizes instabilities which can ‘flip’ the system into 
another regime of behavior (also known as an ‘attractor basin’). Here resilience is 
defined as: 
 
the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system redefines 
its functional structure by changing the variables and processes that control 
behavior. 
An emerging third definition of resilience, also termed ‘adaptive capacity’ (Peterson 
et al. 1998), attempts to capture changing systems in the context of ecological change. 
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Both the engineering resilience and ecological resilience definitions are based on the 
notion of a stationary stability domain. However, empirical evidence suggests that the 
structures and procedures that produce stability change over time and space 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002), hence the emergence of this third definition. In 
ecological systems, adaptive capacity is created and maintained by such factors as 
genetic diversity, biological diversity, and the heterogeneity of landscape mosaics 
(Peterson et al. 1998). In social systems, key parameters are the existence of 
institutions and networks that learn and store knowledge and experience, create 
flexibility in problem solving and balance power among interest groups (Scheffer et 
al. 2000; Berkes et al. 2003). 
Klein et al. (2003) argue that some researchers define resilience as a system attribute 
(i.e., engineering and ecological resilience), while others use it as an ‘umbrella 
concept’ (i.e., adaptive capacity) of a range of desirable system attributes. They stress 
that these umbrella concepts have not been made operational to support planning and 
management, and recommend that resilience only be used in a restricted sense, i.e. to 
describe specific system attributes concerning 1) the amount of disturbance a system 
can absorb and still remain within the same attractor basin, and 2) the degree to which 
the system is capable of self-organization. Klein et al. (2003) propose to adopt the 
concept of adaptive capacity as the umbrella concept where resilience will be one 
factor influencing adaptive capacity. 
 
Walker et al. (2004) acknowledge that the different interpretations of resilience cause 
confusion, and argue that the resilience of a system needs to be considered in terms of 
the attributes that govern a system’s dynamics. They define resilience as: 
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the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while 
undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, 
identity, and feedbacks 
 
and propose four components that constitute resilience: resistance, latitude, 
precariousness, and panarchy. These components are most readily portrayed using the 
metaphor of a ‘stability landscape’ (Figure 4). The metaphor depicts the various states 
of a system as a series of ‘attractor basins’. When the system state is near the lowest 
point of a deep basin, it is stable and requires a substantial shock or change to ‘flip’ 
into an alternative regime. As the system moves closer to a threshold (see below) or if 
the current state is within a small, shallow basin, the shock or change required for 
transition is less.  
 
[FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE – ATTRACTOR BASINS AND THRESHOLDS] 
 
In Figure 4, the depth of the basin (R) is an indication of the ease or difficulty of 
changing the system (i.e., the ‘resistance’ of the system). The latitude of the system 
(L) indicates the ‘width’ of the attractor basin: wider basins can accommodate a 
greater number of system states without crossing a threshold. The distance of the 
system from the threshold (Pr) indicates the ‘precariousness’ of the system at a given 
time (Walker et al. 2004). The ‘panarchy’ component of resilience (Gunderson and 
Holling 2002) acknowledges that systems are dynamic and are continually passing 
through ‘adaptive cycles’ at various linked scales.  
 
[FIGURE 5 NEAR HERE – THE ADAPTIVE CYCLE] 
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The adaptive cycle is a conceptual model of the dynamics of coupled systems of 
people, nature and technology (Gunderson and Holling 2002). They have been shown 
to continually go through dynamic phases of exploitation, conservation, release and 
reorganization (Figure 5). As a system passes through the different stages of the 
adaptive cycle, its resilience is subject to change. Resilience typically declines during 
long, undisturbed phases of stability (the ‘front-loop’ of the adaptive cycle; Berkes et 
al. 2003). During such phases, the tendency of system actors is to promote efficiency 
by removing redundancies in human resources, natural resources, infrastructure and 
operational procedures, and reduce investment in coping and recovery strategies. Such 
control adjustments increase the vulnerability of the system, potentially rendering it 
fragile and prone to collapse when hit by a disturbance (e.g., a disease outbreak). As 
exploitation of the system increases, the net accumulation of system growth (in terms 
of increased functionality or capital) asymptotically approaches zero. At some point 
the system is no longer able to function and collapse becomes the only option. 
Collapse is followed by reorganization and recovery of the system (the ‘back-loop’ of 
the adaptive cycle; Berkes et al. 2003) into a form that might, or might not, be 
desirable. Favorable reorganization and recovery are likely to be accompanied by 
fresh investment, with new components and processes resulting in a reconfiguration 
of the system and increased adaptive capacity. The new extant conditions will 
diminish through the next prolonged phase of stability. The point at which collapse 
becomes inevitable marks a ‘threshold’ in the performance of the system.  
 
The ‘rims’ of the metaphorical attractor basin (Figure 4) indicate thresholds of change 
that can broadly be defined as breakpoints between two regimes of a system (Walker 
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and Meyers 2004). Thresholds can be characterized in terms of the variables along 
which they occur, the variables that they affect, the factors that drive the change, the 
feedbacks that affect the change, and the scale at which the thresholds manifest 
themselves. Thresholds are not constant. They are the result of the interplay between 
factors whose individual dynamics and feedbacks change over time. A system that is 
operating in a seemingly steady state well away from any critical thresholds might 
become threatened by a change that brings the threshold closer to the current state of 
the system; or a threshold that exists today may become irrelevant if a future 
configuration of the system altogether eliminates the feedbacks among variables that 
define the current threshold.  
 
Resilience in Water Resources Planning and Management 
As discussed in Section 2, Hashimoto et al. (1982) proposed and defined the criteria 
of reliability, resilience, and vulnerability to address temporal variability issues 
related to water resource system performance evaluation. Another example of 
resilience thinking in water resources planning and management is the work by 
Fiering from the early 1980s. Fiering (1982a) applied the concept of resilience as used 
in statistics and biology to water resource systems. He argued that a resilient water 
supply system  
 
‘does not respond precipitously to a major surprise or perturbation during the 
course of its economic life, and that neglecting this resilience factor in 
planning an optimum design may produce a system which is cost-effective but 
intolerant of perturbations’. 
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In a second paper, Fiering explored and compared several mathematical definitions 
for resilience of water resource systems (Fiering 1982b). None of the definitions, all 
of which were based on the time required to pass from one system state to another, 
was designated as the best. Some of the definitions involved the probability of 
recovery from failure to an acceptable state within a specified time interval. Fiering 
(1982c) also developed some insights into the resilience of the system in the vicinity 
of its global or local cost optimum and presented a simulation study to define and 
assess the ‘basin property’ of resilience. Resilience indices were calculated according 
to previously published formulas for several reservoir configurations. Fiering (1982d) 
also explored the suitability of canonical correlation for predicting system resilience 
to provide an operational definition of resilience. 
 
Kjeldsen and Rosbjerg (2004), building on the work of Fiering and others, carried out 
a behavior analysis addressing monotonic behavior, overlap and correlation between 
indicators of reliability, resilience and vulnerability of a water resources system. 
Watkins et al. (2004) discussed indices related to a managed system’s ability to cope 
with extreme events and hydrological variability. They proposed robustness as a 
sustainability index, defined a robust system as ‘one that performs optimally, or 
nearly so, under a wide range of conditions’ and referred to the work of Fiering 
(1982a-d) and Hashimoto et al. (1982) for numerical approaches. Watkins et al. 
(2004) argued that these approaches assume that historical hydrology is representative 
of variability in future conditions, and also that water demand can be predicted 
accurately. 
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The literature addressed above suggests that resilience has a long history in water 
resources planning and management. However, the existing formal definitions largely 
encompass what has been termed ‘engineering resilience’ by Holling (1996). 
Although the concepts of reliability, resilience, and vulnerability as defined by 
Hashimoto (1982) may be useful in the context of traditional reservoir management, 
they are not capable of addressing the sustainable performance of the IUWS because 
they largely focus on maintaining constancy and, moreover, carry the assumption of 
predictability. 
 
A Pathway towards Comprehensive Evaluation of Risk in IUWS 
Both risk assessment and resilience thinking are concerned with maintaining the 
performance, or the existence, of systems. It is not surprising then that there are 
commonalities, nor that attention has previously been drawn to the interface between 
risk management frameworks and resilience studies. The different assumptions 
around resilience, resistance and reliability are highlighted in the following examples. 
 
De Bruijn (2004) describes a new way of looking at flood risk management by 
applying a systems approach to better suit it to the socio-economic context in 
which it occurs. The systems approach allows the definition of ‘resilience’ 
(minimizing impacts) and ‘resistance’ (prevention) strategies for flood risk 
management. De Bruijn hypothesizes that a resilience strategy is better able to 
cope with uncertainties, such as inevitable changes in land use and policy, than 
a resistance strategy. It could, however, be argued that these concepts are 
already addressed by risk management that considers prevention, mitigation 
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and emergency response as a spectrum of actions available to control risky 
situations. 
 
Hollnagel (2006), in considering the role of engineering resilience in system 
safety, argues that safety is a system property that emerges from interactions 
between many components including technical, human and organizational 
factors. Insights from complex systems failure studies indicate that safety, 
reflected in normal performance as well as failure, is an emergent rather than 
resultant property of a system (a system ‘does’ rather than ‘has’ safety, often 
as a result of unpredicted actions of operators to unanticipated environments). 
We should actively ensure that systems are, and remain, safe in the face of 
inevitable change. To achieve this, systems should be made resilient (to the 
unknown) rather than reliable (against the known). Focusing on reliability 
(keeping accident probability low by monitoring and adjusting the behavior of 
components) is not enough. 
 
[TABLE 2 NEAR HERE – COMPARISON OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
RESILIENCE APPROACHES] 
 
In Table 2 we summarize the approaches taken in risk management and resilience 
theory. While risk management provides a practical and well accepted framework for 
predicting and managing system performance into the future, its current application 
has a number of shortcomings which are exacerbated when applied to integrated 
(complex) systems; concepts from resilience thinking might well fill some of the 
gaps. A combined risk and resilience approach has potential to: 
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• Overcome the gaps of incomplete prediction and lack of comprehensiveness 
experienced by current risk assessment; 
• Improve anticipation of system failure and hence improve the ability to 
respond in an adaptive way; 
• Provide a method for evaluating response to unforeseen impacts and 
disturbances; 
• Respond in such a way that the resilience of the system is not diminished; 
• Extend the range of responses to allow consideration of alternative, stable 
system states. 
 
We submit that risk assessment’s current lack of comprehensiveness, due to difficulty 
in evaluating interactions and feedbacks, could be partially overcome by evaluating 
the whereabouts of the IUWS on the (metaphorical) adaptive cycle and in the stability 
landscape. Since adaptive capacity is reduced as realization of the capital of the 
system increases (see Figure 5), awareness of the position in the adaptive cycle can 
indicate when the system is becoming vulnerable. If the phase in which the system 
operates is known, premature disturbance and reorganization with its associated small 
disruption to performance becomes a viable option. 
 
A key measure of a system’s position on the adaptive cycle is the adaptive capacity of 
the system. Possible parameters to describe adaptive capacity include redundancy and 
connectivity (or ‘buffering capacity’), flexible or ‘adaptive’ operational management, 
knowledge of the behavior of the system as it approaches a critical threshold (does it 
accelerate towards disaster, or slow down?) and the value of reusable capital 
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following collapse. There is potential to reduce risk of failure (and possibly increase 
resilience) by adjusting the parameters that increase adaptive capacity. For example, 
establishing laws to rapidly introduce water use restrictions in times of drought will 
increase the system’s adaptive capacity; when the risk of service delivery failure 
becomes unacceptable, the process of introducing restrictions can be smooth and 
rapid. Evaluation of parameters that indicate the system’s adaptive capacity could, at 
least, be employed to check that proposed risk treatments are unlikely to reduce 
system resilience. The adaptive capacity of the system could also be used to provide 
an indication of its ability to respond to unforeseen impacts and disturbances. 
Adaptive capacity, therefore, becomes a measure of system performance that 
improves risk management and that could be included in the suite of performance 
measures used to evaluate sustainability (see Figure 3).  
 
Risk assessment thresholds, based on man-derived criteria, often fall short of 
representing true system failure, whereas break-point thresholds in resilience theory 
represent changes in system performance that lead to collapse. If risk assessment were 
informed by identification of critical, break-point thresholds, and if proximity to 
catastrophic failure could be anticipated, then the risk could be appropriately handled. 
The risk function, which currently allows infrequent events and slow change to be 
disregarded however catastrophic the consequence, could be supplemented by 
consideration of the proximity of the system to collapse and its likely response to 
unexpected shocks, and the chance of catastrophic failure could be reduced . Such an 
approach would partially overcome the ‘wicked’ nature of the system’s performance, 
which prevents it from being amenable to micro-management based on identified 
causal paths (Rittel and Webber 1973). Greater awareness of the dynamics of the 
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system and the environment in which it functions would encourage consideration of 
transitions to alternative states as viable management options. 
 
From the perspective of resilience, knowledge of the uncertainty associated with the 
control state and its sensitivity to small changes in controls provides additional 
understanding of the system’s ability to remain within an ‘attractor basin’ or to move 
to a desirable alternative (see Figure 4) and hence stay within an ‘acceptable’ range. 
As the system moves towards a threshold, analysis of the control state can identify 
individual controls within each domain that have potential to bring the system back 
into an acceptable (low-risk) state, or hasten transition to a desirable new state with 
enhanced resilience. Thresholds themselves could be managed using a similar 
approach to decrease the risk (Walker and Meyers 2004).  
 
In summary, the challenge is to understand both the thresholds in and the adaptive 
capacity of urban water systems, and to utilize this understanding to identify and 
modify controls in such a way that the risk of uncontrolled system collapse is reduced 
and its sustainability is maintained or enhanced. 
 
We suggest that incorporating the following activities into a risk management 
framework would help to identify options and system configurations with a reduced 
risk of the IUWS becoming unsustainable: 
 
1. Analysis of the system to determine thresholds, especially irreversible thresholds, 
and analysis of the consequences of crossing them. Criteria for unacceptable risk 
can then be determined with reference to these thresholds. 
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Example: Reduced and highly concentrated flow in the wastewater system caused 
by greywater recycling might lead to eutrophication, gasification or stasis, with 
associated degradation and collapse of infrastructure. The effect is likely to be 
exacerbated by increasing average annual temperatures causing accelerated 
chemical reactions. By determining and monitoring the conditions under which 
such changes occur (flow rate, temperature, concentrations), breakdown of the 
system could be avoided. 
 
2. Assessment of the adaptive capacity of urban water systems. A highly adaptive 
system accommodates risk reduction and consequence mitigation more readily.  
 
Example: A currently unknown pathogen is found to evade the standard test for 
greywater treatment processes. All treatment plants must be modified to remove 
the pathogen. It might be easier to upgrade catchment- or neighborhood-scale 
plants than to upgrade individual household-scale plants.  
 
3. Maintenance of adaptive capacity. The capacity of the system to remain adaptive 
and resilient should be maintained; it should not be depleted by over-zealous or 
ill-informed risk management practices.  
 
Example: An IUWS has been modified by introducing overflows between 
stormwater and wastewater systems that allow stormwater to flow into the 
wastewater system during times of heavy rain. As the wastewater system becomes 
more stressed, sewage is inadvertently introduced to the stormwater system 
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through the overflow. The original design was more adaptive, as there are more 
options for disposal of uncontaminated stormwater than for stormwater that has 
been contaminated with raw sewage. 
 
The above activities can become an integral part of the risk management process (see 
Figure 2) if they are recognized at the outset. It might be possible to include 
consideration of critical thresholds in the selection of criteria for acceptable risks, and 
evaluation of risks could include assessment of the adaptive capacity of the system. 
Proposed treatment of risks should ensure that adaptive capacity is maintained. 
Adoption of such a comprehensive risk assessment framework would greatly improve 
the potential for risk management to contribute to sustainability. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Comprehensive risk management that addresses controlling factors within and across 
a wide range of domains, and that considers how these controls can be managed to 
enhance the system’s adaptive capacity, will enhance the sustainability of integrated 
urban water systems (IUWS). Having identified commonalities and differences 
between the two fields of risk assessment and resilience thinking, we have concluded 
that detailed consideration of the adaptive capacity, and analysis of system thresholds, 
would provide worthwhile amendments to current risk assessment practices for the 
IUWS. We suggest that such a comprehensive risk management framework would not 
only support decision-making based on sustainability principles, but would also have 
application to system design, maintenance and monitoring.  
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Our discourse emphasized that a key commonality is the identification of the potential 
of a system to fail, or ‘collapse’. While resilience theory has the potential to allow 
identification of the proximity of the system to thresholds bordering undesirable or 
new, more desirable regimes, risk management has the tools to identify relevant 
controls, prevent unwanted transitions and enhance transition to new, more stable 
ones.  
 
Resilience theory highlights the importance of the location of the system on the 
adaptive cycle, reflecting its adaptive capacity and taking account of the complex 
interactions of multiple controls. Risk assessment can be enriched by embracing the 
concept of adaptive capacity, ensuring that changes to controls to reduce risk do not 
reduce adaptive capacity. Indeed, risk can often be reduced by enhancing adaptive 
capacity.  
 
Research into practical methods for evaluating the adaptive capacity should be 
encouraged. Ultimately, adaptive capacity resides in institutions and individuals rather 
than in physical system parts such as pumps and pipes. A full resilience perspective 
on risk management, therefore, would require quantification of such abstract system 
features as diversity, efficiency and connectedness. However, given the current lack 
of practical tools, efforts to evaluate adaptive capacity would initially need to focus on 
system parts that are more easily quantified, for example using network analysis or 
agent-based modeling. 
 
The single value criterion or risk curves favored by current risk assessment methods 
are a simplified representation of the multidimensional thresholds in resilience 
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thinking. Whereas risk assessment tends to use limited information to select criteria 
and then regard the values as immutable, resilience thinking acknowledges the 
evolutionary nature of thresholds. The consequences of crossing a threshold are not 
always undesirable; collapse into a new ‘attractor basin’ in the stability landscape can 
give rise to opportunities to increase system potential. For example, when a certain 
system component breaks down, the part might be replaced with a new part that 
changes the system’s function and enhances its overall viability and robustness, a 
benefit that more than compensates for the temporary inconvenience of the initial 
breakdown. This calls for a rethinking of the word ‘risk’: collapse and control failure 
that posed a high risk in conventional risk assessment may actually become 
opportunities when the risk of failure to deliver sustainable outcomes, as informed by 
the resilience metaphors, becomes the focus of analysis. 
 
In practice, the identification of thresholds could be problematic. Some system 
thresholds can be characterized because they have been crossed before. In general, 
though, this is not the case and some means of identifying thresholds is needed. To 
date there are no examples of where ‘new’ thresholds in coupled social and ecological 
systems have been predicted (Walker and Meyers 2004), although some approaches to 
the problem have been suggested (e.g. Anderies 2004; Carpenter and Brock 2004). 
Identification of thresholds in an IUWS has not yet been explored, although the 
metaphor of “resilient cities” has been proposed as a promising new tool for 
promoting closer links among urban designers, ecologists and social scientists (Pickett 
et al. 2004). Despite the increased awareness of the need to be able to proactively 
manage thresholds, the question of whether or not a threshold can be identified before 
it has been crossed remains unanswered.  
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Currently, managing risk by identifying thresholds and continually monitoring and 
controlling the system’s proximity to them is a long way from realization. However, 
we have at least provided a rationale for incorporating concepts of thresholds and 
adaptive capacity into risk management methodologies. By maintaining the system’s 
adaptive capacity, the ability to manage thresholds will be enhanced, since a highly 
adaptive system is endowed with more options to prevent collapse. If breakpoint 
thresholds have been identified, critical controls can be monitored and adjusted to 
maintain sustainability.  
 
The challenge for the risk assessment community will be to reconsider what ‘risk’ 
really is: in a resilience context, events traditionally seen as risks are not necessarily 
bad, and may be turned into opportunities. In addition, comprehensive risk assessment 
faces the challenge of incorporating aspects of holistic systems performance, to 
supplement scientific determinacy and accommodate dynamic, indeterminate effects 
of complexity. 
 
The challenge for the resilience community, on the other hand, will be to demonstrate 
the ability to identify thresholds and the system’s proximity to them – especially in 
examples from urban systems. 
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Tables 
Table 1 Definitions of resilience and related concepts in the context of environmental 
management. 
Concept Definition Assumptions and 
Objectives 




the return time to a 
steady sate following a 
perturbation 
 
- Efficiency, constancy, 
predictability 
 
- Single static stability 
domain 




the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be 
absorbed before the 
system redefines its 
functional structure by 
changing the variables 
and processes that 
control behavior 
- Persistence, change, 
unpredictability 
 
- Multiple static steady 
states 
   
Adaptability 
Adaptive Capacity1  
 
 
the capacity of actors in 
the system to influence 
resilience (in a social-
ecological system, 
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essentially to manage it)  






the capacity of a system 
to absorb disturbance 
and reorganize while 
undergoing change so as 
to still retain essentially 
the same function, 






the capacity to create a 
fundamentally new 
system when ecological, 
economic, or social 
structures make the 
existing system 
untenable 
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Table 2 Comparison of risk management and resilience approaches. 
Risk Management Resilience 
  
Is generally accepted as a component of 
strategic and operational planning and 
practice 
Is a theory seeking validation and 
quantification 
  
Deconstructionist approach, considers 
component performance; can 
accommodate local variance 
Holistic approach, considers whole-of-
system performance 
  
Requires clearly defined objectives and 
measures 
Represents an overall measure of 
sustainability 
  
Tends to suffer from incomplete 
prediction arising from unrecognized 
controls, influences and feedbacks 
Relies on total, indiscriminate systems 
analysis – does not recognize “unusual” 
influences and local effects 
  
Assessment predicts likelihood of failure 
and magnitude of consequence 
Assessment methods predict position on 
adaptive cycle, proximity to thresholds 
  
Risk is risk OF something happening –
internal causation  
Resilience is resilience TO something 
happening – external causation 
  
Addresses expected perturbations Tends to address unexpected 
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perturbations 
  
“Failure” is determined by man-made 
thresholds and criteria that are vulnerable 
to misrepresentation 
“Collapse” involves crossing break-point 
thresholds into new regimes 
  
Analysis accommodates fundamental 
laws of science, engineering analysis, 
expert opinion and consultative inputs 
and probability theory 
Analysis based on complex systems and 
stable states theory, firmly rooted in 
mathematics 
  
Tends to concentrate on fast to medium-
term variables 
Pays attention to both fast and slow 
variables 
  
System state is determined by control 
state and uncontrollable factors 
System state is determined by system 
position in a ‘stability landscape’ and 
stage in the adaptive cycle 
  
Adjusts performance to avoid collapse Accepts inevitability of collapse 
  
Tends to encourage maintenance of 
known, low risk control states – a defined 
path to achieve system performance 
Multiple stable basins acknowledge 
alternative resilient states 
  
Failure triggers corrective action Collapse is followed by natural 






Figure 1. The risk management process  
 
Figure 2. Urban water system domains 
 
Figure 3. Controls in each domain act upon the technical system to produce a 
consequence. 
 
Figure 4. Attractor basins and thresholds: L = latitude; R = resistance; and Pr = 
precariousness (Walker et al. 2004, with permission) 
 
Figure 5. The adaptive cycle (Gunderson and Holling 2002, with permission) 
 











Blackmore & Plant: Figure 1. 












Blackmore & Plant: Figure 2. 

















Blackmore & Plant: Figure 3. 
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